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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Shey Marie Schoger appeals from the summary dismissal of her petition 
for post conviction relief. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedinqs 
Schoger filed a petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp. 5-10.) 
Appointed counsel filed an amended petition. (R., pp. 16-30.) The amended 
petition alleged that Schoger had been charged with trafficking in more than 400 
grams of methamphetamine, but that a plea agreement had been reached with 
the state that would allow her to plead to trafficking in 200 to 400 grams of 
methamphetamine. (R., pp. 17-18.) The trial court, however, rejected her plea 
when she stated she had no intent to control more than the 52 grams of 
methamphetamine found on her person and also rejected receiving the plea 
without a factual basis. (R., pp. 18, 23A-24.) Schoger alleged she was ultimately 
convicted of trafficking in 400 grams or more of methamphetamine and 
sentenced to 15 years with ten years fixed. (R., pp. 17-18.) 
Schoger alleged that her trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to 
prepare her to answer the court's questions. (R., p. 18.) She also alleged that 
the court had erred in rejecting her attempted guilty plea. (R., pp. 18-19.) 
Finally, she alleged her appellate counsel was deficient for failing to claim on 
appeal that the trial court erred in rejecting her attempted guilty plea. (R., p. 19.) 
The state filed an answer and motion to dismiss. (R., pp. 38-42.) The 
state asserted dismissal of the petition was appropriate because that claim was 
not supported by more than a "broad and conclusory statement unsupported by 
affidavit or other record," because the defendant was aware of the elements of 
trafficking in methamphetamine, because "any confusion" at the attempted plea 
was not the result of deficient performance of trial counsel, and because the 
record of the hearing where the plea was rejected "stands for itself." (R., pp. 40- 
42.) 
After a hearing and receiving briefing from the parties on the state's 
motion to dismiss the petition, the district court granted the motion. (R., pp. 49- 
61 .) The district court first set forth a procedural history of the underlying criminal 
case. (R., pp. 49-51.) The district court then set forth the procedural history of 
the instant case. (R., pp. 51-52.) The district court then found no issues of 
material fact related to the petition. (R., pp. 52-59.) Specifically, the district court 
first found a sufficient allegation that trial counsel had failed to adequately explain 
the elements of trafficking and therefore met the deficient performance prong, but 
found no allegation of prejudice because "[tlhe only manner in which Petitioner's 
trial counsel could have changed the outcome would have been by persuading 
the Petitioner to falsely testify as to the factual basis upon which the plea of guilty 
might have been accepted." (R., pp. 54-56.) The court also rejected the claims 
that the court abused its discretion in refusing to accept an Alford plea or that 
appellate counsel was deficient for failing to raise this as an issue because 
Schoger had cited no legal authority for the proposition that the court was 
required to accept such a plea. (R., pp. 56-59.) 
Schoger appealed from the district court's order. (R., pp. 62-64.) 
ISSUES 
Schoger states the issues on appeal as: 
A. Was dismissal of the claim of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel improper given that there was a genuine question of 
material fact as to whether counsel's failure to advise his client of 
the elements of the charge was prejudicial? 
B. Was dismissal of the claim that the District Court erred in 
refusing to accept the guilty plea improperly dismissed given that 
there is a right to plead guilty in ldaho? 
C. Was the dismissal of the claim of ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel improper given that there was a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether the failure of appellate counsel to raise 
issues related to the improper refusal of the guilty plea was 
prejudicial? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 6.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Schoger at no time claimed that she would have admitted that she 
possessed 200 grams or more of methamphetamine had her counsel explained 
the elements of that offense. Has Schoger failed to show error in the district 
court's conclusion that she failed to allege any claim of prejudice arising from her 
claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to inform her of the elements of 
trafficking in at least 200 grams of methamphetamine? 
2. Is Schoger's argument that ldaho law should limit a court's discretion to 
reject a guilty plea beyond what is established in the Constitution of the United 
States not preserved for appeal because it was never raised below? Likewise, is 




Schoqer Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Determination That 
She Had Failed To Alleae Prejudice From Her Counsel's Alleqedly Deficient 
Performance in Failinq To Inform Her Of The Elements Of Traffickinq In Between 
200 And 400 Grams Of Methamphetamine 
A. Introduction 
The district court, after assuming for purposes of the motion that Schoger 
had made a prima facie showing of deficient performance in her allegation that 
her trial counsel had failed to inform her of the elements of trafficking in 
methamphetamine, found that Schoger had not made a prima facie showing of 
prejudice from that deficiency. (R., pp. 54-56.) On appeal Schoger argues the 
district court erred because she "could have logically" misconstrued what the 
court at the plea hearing was asking her to admit, and had she been better 
informed "she would have given different answers to the court's questions." 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 9-10.) The flaw in this argument is that it is utterly devoid 
of any support by any factual allegation actually made on the record. 
B. Standard of Review 
In reviewing the summary dismissal of a post-conviction application, the 
appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact 
exists which, if resolved in petitioner's favor, would require relief to be granted. 
Nellsch v. State, 122 Idaho 426, 430, 835 P.2d 661, 665 (Ct. App. 1992). The 
court freely reviews the district court's application of the law. at 434, 835 P.2d 
at 669. 
C. Contrary To Schoqer's Appellate Arqument, She Never Alleaed That She 
Would Have Answered The Court's lnquirv Differentlv Had She Been 
Better Informed Bv Counsel 
To establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a 
post-conviction petitioner must provide admissible evidence that (1) counsel's 
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) there is 
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result would have been 
different. Strickland v. Washinaton, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Mitchell v. 
State, 132 ldaho 274, 277, 971 P.2d 727, 730 (1998); State v. Fields, 127 ldaho 
904, 908 P.2d 1211 (1995) (adopting Strickland's bipartite test in ldaho). Bare 
assertions and speculation, unsupported by specific facts, do not make out a 
prima facie case for ineffective assistance of counsel. Roman v. State, 125 
ldaho 644,649,873 P.2d 898,903 (Ct. App. 1994). 
The district court held that Schoger had shown no prejudice because she 
did not allege that she would have answered the court's questions at the plea 
hearing differently, and therefore the hearing would not have ended differently. 
(R., pp. 54-56.) Schoger argues on appeal that the court should have concluded 
that she "could have logically" misconstrued the court's questions regarding the 
element of possession, and claims, without citation to the record, that she "would 
have given different answers" had her attorney explained "the finer points of 
constructive possession." (Appellant's brief, pp. 9-10.) The flaw in this argument 
is that Schoger never alleged, or presented evidence to make a prima facie 
showing, that she misunderstood the court's questions or that she would have 
given different answers to those questions had her attorney explained 
constructive possession. (R., pp. 17-29.) Schoger's argument is without merit. 
II. 
Schoaer's Claims That ldaho Law Should Include A Riaht To Chanae A Plea To 
Guilty Are Not Preserved 
A. Introduction 
The district court concluded that the Constitution of the United States did 
not grant an absolute right to enter a guilty plea, and that Schoger had therefore 
failed to make a prima facie case of an abuse of discretion by the district court, or 
show ineffective assistance of counsel for not making such a claim on appeal. 
(R., pp. 56-59 (citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 n . l l  (1970).) The 
court noted that Schoger had "not identified a single instance in which a trial 
court has been found to have committed error by refusing to accept a guilty plea." 
(R., p. 58.) At the time, the court refused to accept the guilty plea because the 
factual basis asserted by Schoger during the colloquy was inconsistent with guilt. 
(R., pp. 23A-24.) 
On appeal, for the first time, Schoger argues that ldaho Criminal Rule 11 
should be interpreted as conferring an absolute right to enter a knowing and 
voluntary guilty plea even if the defendant's stated factual basis for the plea is 
inconsistent with guilt, and thus the court erred and appellate counsel should 
have raised this issue on appeal. (Appellant's brief, pp. 11-20.) This argument is 
not preserved because it was not raised below. Even if considered on the merits, 
Schoger has failed to show error. 
B. Standard of Review 
Summary disposition under I.C. 3 19-4906(b) is the procedural equivalent 
of summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56. Ramirez v. State, 113 ldaho 87, 89, 
741 P.2d 374, 376 (Ct. App. 1987). On review from summary disposition, the 
court exercises free review. Nellsch v. State, 122 ldaho 426, 431, 835 P.2d 661, 
666 (Ct. App. 1992). Summary dismissal is permissible if the facts, resolved in 
petitioner's favor, do not entitle the petitioner to relief as a matter of law. 
Gonzales v. State, 120 ldaho 759, 763, 819 P.2d 1159, 1163 (Ct. App. 1991); 
Hoover v. State, 114 ldaho 145, 146, 754 P.2d 458, 459 (Ct. App. 1988). 
C. Schoqer Did Not Preserve Her Claims That The Court Was Required To 
Accept Her Guiltv Plea Under I.C.R. 11 
Generally, failure to raise an issue in the district court, therefore denying 
the trial court the opportunity to rule on the alleged error, constitutes waiver of 
that issue on appeal. State v. Martin, 119 ldaho 577, 579, 808 P.2d 1322, 1324 
(1 991). See also State v. Mauro, 121 ldaho 178, 181, 824 P.2d 109, 112 (1991); 
State v. Smith, 130 ldaho 450, 454, 942 P.2d 574, 578 (Ct. App. 1997). This rule 
prohibits, for example, an appellant from claiming, for the first time on appeal, 
that the ldaho Constitution grants greater rights than the federal constitution. 
State v. Wheaton, 121 ldaho 404, 407-08, 825 P.2d 501, 503-04 (1992); State v. 
Palmer, 138 ldaho 931, 935, 71 P.3d 1078, 1082 (Ct. App. 2003). In addition, a 
party who takes one position in the trial court is estopped from taking a contrary 
position on appeal. State v. Carlson, 134 ldaho 389, 402, 3 P.3d 67, 80 (Ct. App. 
2000). 
On appeal Schoger claims that Idaho law, specifically I.C.R. 11, conferred 
upon her a right not granted by the Constitution: the right to have the district 
court accept her guilty plea despite her claim of factual innocence. (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 11-20.) As the district court noted, however, Schoger argued below 
that the court had discretion to accept or reject her guilty plea. (R., p. 58.) 
Schoger's argument below that the court had discretion to accept or reject the 
change of plea forecloses her argument on appeal that the court lacked any 
discretion to reject the proffered change of plea. 
D. Even If Considered For The First Time On Appeal, Schoaer's Arqument 
That The Court Lacked Discretion To Not Accept Her Chanae Of Plea Is 
Without Merit 
Schoger argues on appeal that the court erred in dismissing both her 
claim of error in the criminal case and her claim of ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel. Specifically, she claims that the district court in the criminal 
case was required to accept her guilty plea despite the fact that her proffered 
factual basis for the plea was inconsistent with actual guilt, and therefore her 
post-conviction claim of error had merit and her claim of ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel had merit. (Appellant's brief, pp. 11-20.) Both of these claims 
fail on the underlying premise; a court is not required to accept a plea in the 
absence of a factual basis for accepting the plea. 
To be entitled to relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the 
petitioner must demonstrate that (1) counsel's performance fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness and that (2) there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceedings would have 
been different. Strickland v. Washinaton, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). The 
Strickland standard applies to both trial and appellate counsel. Evitts v. Lucey, 
469 U.S. 387 (1985); Mitchell v. State, 132 ldaho 274, 276, 971 P.2d 727, 730 
(1998). The relevant inquiry on the prejudice prong in relation to appellate 
counsel is whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, 
the petitioner would have prevailed on appeal. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 
285 (2000). Because Schoger's claim that an ldaho district court is required to 
accept a guilty plea where the factual basis claimed by the defendant is 
inconsistent with guilt is without merit, she has failed to show that she presented 
in her petition a prima facie claim of either direct error or of deficient performance 
or prejudice flowing from appellate counsel's decision to not raise this as an 
issue in the direct appeal. 
It is well established in ldaho law that a district court may, as part of the 
plea colloquy, inquire of the defendant "to establish a factual basis for accepting 
[the guilty plea]." State v. Wilkins, 125 ldaho 215, 217-18, 868 P.2d 1231, 1233- 
34 (1994); State v. Heffern, 130 ldaho 946, 950 P.2d 1285 (Ct. App. 1997). 
Although there is generally no requirement that the court elicit a factual basis for 
the plea, State v. Peterson, 126 ldaho 522, 524, 887 P.2d 67, 69 (Ct. App. 1994), 
a court must establish a factual basis before accepting a plea if the defendant 
refuses to admit his participation in the crime or continues to assert his 
innocence. State v. Horklev, 125 ldaho 860, 862-63, 876 P.2d 142, 144-45 (Ct. 
App. 1994). 
Because no factual basis for accepting the plea was established at the 
sentencing hearing (R., pp. 21A-24), it is clear under ldaho law that the district 
court did not err in rejecting Schoger's attempt to plead guilty. Thus, her 
arguments that the court erred are without merit. Likewise, because no error can 
be shown, her appellate counsel's performance in not raising the issue was not 
deficient and Schoger has shown no prejudice. 
Schoger argues that I.C.R. 11 mandated the acceptance of her proffered 
Alford plea. (Appellant's brief, pp. 11-18.) The first problem with this argument is 
that it ignores ldaho law and relies exclusively upon cases from other 
jurisdictions. As shown above, ldaho law would at least view as potentially 
erroneous the acceptance of a plea without a factual basis on the record at the 
time of the plea where the defendant specifically denied factual guilt. Schoger 
had no right to raise in post conviction this novel theory as a claim of trial court 
error. I.C. 3 19-4901(b) (post-conviction is not substitute for direct appeal). 
Likewise, failure to raise a novel claim is not deficient performance of counsel. 
State v. Mathews, 133 ldaho 300, 308, 986 P.2d 323, 341 (1999); see also 
Huqhes v. State, 598 S.E.2d 43, 46 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004); Haight v. 
Commonwealth, 41 S.W.3d 436, 448 (Ky. 2001) ("While the failure to advance an 
established legal theory may result in ineffective assistance of counsel under 
Strickland, the failure to advance a novel theory never will."); Sistrunk v. Vauqhn, 
96 F.3d 666, 670 (3rd Cir. 1996); accord Lott v. Covle, 261 F.3d 594, 609 (6th 
Cir. 2001); Fann v. Bowersox, 247 F.3d 841, 843 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. 
m, 273 F.3d 991, 993 ( I  I th Cir. 2001). 
Schoger's argument -- that Idaho law should be changed or expanded to 
include a duty to accept a plea even where the defendant claims actual 
innocence -- does not present a viable claim in post-conviction because it cannot 
be raised as a direct claim of error, and because it is a novel theory that 
appellate counsel was not constitutionally required to raise. Even if this 
argument were not rejected for these reasons, however, it should be rejected 
because Schoger has failed to cite a single appellate court decision holding that 
a district court is bound to accept a defendant's change of plea where the factual 
basis asserted by that defendant is inconsistent with guilt. To the contrary, the 
cases she relies on to argue a court must accept a guilty plea appear to except 
circumstances such as presented in this case. 
In State v. Martin, 614 P.2d 164 (Wash. 1980) (cited at Appellant's brief, 
pp. 12-13), the court held that a defendant has, under Washington law, the right 
to plead guilty at arraignment. The court specifically noted, however, that it was 
unaware of any authority to decline "a plea of guilty made competently, 
knowingly, voluntarily, unconditionally, unequivocally and on advice of counsel.'' 
Id. at 166 (emphasis added). The plea in that case was not "equivocal," which -
the court defined as "whenever a defendant attempts to make a plea which by its 
very wording couples a protestation of innocence with an assertion of guilt." && 
at 167. Because Schoger did not enter an unequivocal plea, this case has no 
application to her. In addition, subsequent cases interpreting Martin make it clear 
that the right attaches only to the initial plea at arraignment, not a subsequent 
change of plea. State v. James, 739 P.2d 699, 702 (Wash. 1987) (Martin applies 
only to pleas entered at arraignment); State v. Thom~son, 806 P.2d 1251, 1253 
(Wash. App., Div. 2, 1991). There are no parallels between Martin and this case 
that in any way benefit Schoger. 
In Graham v. Commonwealth, 397 S.E.2d 270 (Va. App. 1990) (cited 
Appellant's brief, pp. 12-13), the appellate court concluded that language in the 
state constitution that "the accused may plead guilty," combined with statutory 
language providing only that the "court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty to 
any lesser offense included in the charge upon which the accused is arraigned," 
did not "allow a court to reject a criminal defendant's guilty plea to the whole of 
the indictment." & at 272-73. Of course in this case Schoger did not attempt to 
plead guilty to "the whole of the indictment," but only a "lesser offense included in 
the charge upon which [she] was arraigned." This case is, on its face, 
inapplicable to the issue before this Court. 
Schoger next cites to State v. Pe~low, 36 P.3d 922 (Montana 2001) (cited 
Appellant's brief, pp. 12-14), where the court employed a rule of statutory 
interpretation that the word "may" imposes a mandatory duty on the court. Id. at 
931 (statute stating that guilty plea "may" be accepted under certain conditions 
means court is "mandated to accept plea if conditions are met). Schoger has 
cited no authority requiring the word "may" to be so interpreted in Idaho, or what 
statute should be so interpreted. 
Finally, Schoger relies on In Re Vasquez-Ramirez 443 F.3d 692 (91h Cir. 
2006) (cited Appellant's brief, pp. 12, 14), for the proposition that a court may not 
reject a guilty plea under Fed.R.Crim.Pro. 11. The court in that opinion, however, 
premised its reasoning specifically on the fact that the plea was "naked," i.e. 
unencumbered by any agreement or other waiver. a at 697. The court noted 
that its holding is consistent with other circuits that hold trial courts have 
"discretion to reject naked guilty pleas only when the pleas fail to meet the Rule 
I l ( b )  requirements ...." - Id. at 699. Two of the three cases it cites to are as 
follows: "see, e.g., United States v. Brown, 331 F.3d 591, 594-95 (8th Cir. 2003) 
(holding that, in the context of a plea that lacks a factual basis, the 'district court 
necessarily possesses broad discretion in deciding to accept or reject [it]' 
th . . . . ); . . . see also United Sfates v. O'Brien, 601 F.2d 1067, 1069 (9 Clr. 1979) ('A 
trial court has discretion to accept or reject a guilty plea ... of one who 
protests his innocence.')" Icf. (emphasis added, brackets and ellipses in 
internal quotes original). The Vas~uez-Ramirez case specifically limited its 
holding to circumstances not present in this case and also favorably cites 
authority that directly supports the district court's discretion to reject the plea 
when the defendant asserts factual innocence. 
Schoger cites no authority for the proposition that a court is without 
discretion to reject a guilty plea from a defendant who maintains her factual 
innocence. The authority she does cite is careful to limit its holdings to 
circumstances where the defendant is pleading the same charge upon which she 
was arraigned and is not equivocating about factual guilt. Thus, her argument is 
without legal authority in support. In contrast, the courts that have held that a 
trial court may reject a plea where the factual basis offered by the defendant is 
inconsistent with guilt are many. E.q., United States v. Bednarski, 445 F.2d 364, 
366 (1'' Cir. 1971) (rule requiring acceptance of plea of person claiming actual 
innocence would not promote public policy); United States v. Hernandez-Rivas, 
513 F.3d 753 (7Ih Cir. 2008) (rejection of guilty plea where defendant would not 
provide adequate factual basis for plea was proper); United States v. Preciado, 
336 F.3d 739, 743 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. O'Brien, 601 F.2d 1067, 1069- 
70 (gth Cir. 1979) (rule requiring acceptance of plea of person claiming actual 
innocence would not promote public policy); Howard v. State, 458 A.2d 1180, 
1184-85 (Del. 1983) (no error for court to reject plea of defendant professing 
innocence); Ortiz v. United States, 2008 WL 51 5003, *2 (D.C. App. 2008) ("Even 
after a factual basis for a plea is established, a trial court may still reject a plea 
and refuse to enter judgment when the defendant maintains his innocence."); 
People v. Ottomanelli, 505 N.E.2d 1328 (111. App. 1987) ("a court is not obliged to 
accept a plea of guilty from a defendant who professes innocence"); Jenninas v. 
m, 723 N.E.2d 970, 972 (Ind. 2000). 
Schoger did not argue below that the district court was without discretion 
to reject her guilty plea because of her claim of factual innocence, and in fact 
argued that the court had discretion -- her appellate argument that the court 
lacked discretion is therefore precluded. Even if considered, Schoger has 
provided no authority whatsoever supporting the argument that a court must 
accept a defendant's guilty plea despite her protestations of factual innocence - 
courts that have directly addressed this issue have uniformly held that rejection 
of a guilty plea under such circumstances is proper. Schoger has failed to show 
error. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the summary dismissal 
of Schoger's petition for post conviction relief. 
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